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ABSTRACT:  Sellars once remarked on the “astonishing extent to which in ethics as well as 
in epistemology and metaphysics the fundamental themes of Kant’s philosophy contain the 
truth of the variations we now hear on every side” (SM x).  Also astonishing was Sellars’ 
1970 Presidential Address to the American Philosophical Association (APA), which borrowed its 
title from the phrase in Kant’s Paralogisms, “...this I or he or it (the thing) which thinks...” 
(B404).  In its compact twenty-five pages Sellars managed to sketch novel yet plausible 
reconstructions of central aspects of Kant’s views on self-knowledge, persons, freedom, and 
morality, along the way suggesting how all of those Kantian views could plausibly be 
rendered consistent with a naturalistic ontology. In this chapter I focus on Sellars’ APA 
address as an occasion for reflection on how both Kant and Sellars offer insights into how 
we ought best to conceive the nature of and the relationships between our thinking selves, 
our practical agency, and our entirely natural, material embodiment.   
 
 
 
* * * 
 
  In the Preface to Science and Metaphysics Sellars remarked on the “astonishing extent to 
which in ethics as well as in epistemology and metaphysics the fundamental themes of Kant’s 
philosophy contain the truth of the variations we now hear on every side” (SM x). 1  Also 
astonishing, in many ways, was Sellars’ own 1970 Presidential Address to the American Philosophical 
Association (APA), which borrowed its title from the phrase in Kant’s Paralogisms, “...this I or he 
or it (the thing) which thinks...” (A346/B404).2 In its compact twenty-five pages Sellars managed 
to sketch novel yet plausible reconstructions of central aspects of Kant’s views on self-knowledge, 
persons, freedom, and morality, along the way suggesting how all of those Kantian views could 
plausibly be rendered consistent with a naturalistic ontology. In this chapter I want to focus on 
Sellars’ APA address as an occasion for reflection on how both Kant and Sellars – or so I will 
contend – offer insights into how we ought best to conceive the nature of and the relationships 
between our thinking selves, our practical agency, and our entirely natural, material embodiment.   
 
I 
 
 On Sellars’ view, and I think for Kant too, what most fundamentally unites the theoretical 
domain of our cognition of objects with the practical domain of freedom and morality is our 
 
1 References to Sellars’ works are according to the standard abbreviations for his works listed in the 
References, followed by one or more of the following (depending on the work): chapter or part, sections 
or paragraphs (§), added paragraph numbering in recent Ridgeview editions (¶), or page numbers.  I follow 
a standard practice among philosophers of using ‘single’ quotation marks for mentioning items and for 
‘scare quote’ qualifications, reserving “double” quotation marks for direct quotations. 
 
2 References to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason are to the standard ‘A/B’ (first edition/second edition) marginal 
page numbers, all translations here taken from the Guyer and Wood Cambridge edition. 
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capacity for thought; or more particularly, for thought as governed by various norms of reasoning.  
Both sense perception and volition, for example, are fundamentally species of conceptual thinking, 
for Sellars.  As he put it in his 1967 Lindley Lecture on ethical theory:   
 
(§1)  The focal point of practical reasoning is action, as the focal point of empirical 
reasoning is observation. Perceptual takings or 'judgments' are the thoughts which typically 
arise from the impact of the world on our mind through our sensory capacities. Volitions 
are the thoughts which typically impinge on the world through our motor capacities.   
  
(§2)   Intentions can be thought of, somewhat metaphorically, as practical commitments. 
Volitions can correspondingly be thought of as practical commitments to do something 
here and now, and hence as a special case of commitments to do something at sometime or 
other. (FCET §§1–2) 
 
Sellars’ primary model for thought – that is, for how to understand what thought is – is in terms of 
our public verbal behaviour as reflected in various norm-governed causal patterns of inference, 
and in various norm-governed causal patterns of perceptual response and intentional action in 
relation to one’s environment. Sellars furthermore famously argued in ‘Empiricism and the 
Philosophy of Mind’ (EPM, 1956), in his ‘myth of genius Jones’ (cf. EPM X–XV), that the further 
naturalistic posit of a kind of representationalist “Mentalese” or language of thought in the 
mind/brain was not only permissible but required on overall explanatory grounds.  But for present 
purposes we can stick to the public, pragmatic, and Wittgensteinian features of Sellars’ conceptions 
of meaning and of thought in terms of norm-governed usage and of functional roles respectively, 
which for most philosophical purposes also fits the spirit of Kant’s view of concepts as involving 
in the prescription of rules (cf. O’Shea 2016a). 
 
 In his APA address on Kant, accordingly, Sellars focuses on the character of our thinking 
across both the theoretical and practical domains.  The lead question of the article is the same as 
Kant’s in the Paralogisms: namely, what is the nature of our thinking being, or as Sellars puts it, of 
‘an I’, or of ‘this I’, “meaning roughly whatever can be referred to by an appropriate tokening of 
‘I’ ” (I §3)?  He then proceeds to defend both Kant’s epistemic account of the a priori unity of an 
I, as a necessary condition of the possibility of experience, and Kant’s diagnosis of the fallacies 
involved in traditional metaphysical accounts of the nature of such a thinking being, as the subject 
matter of a putative ‘Rational Psychology’ (I §5). Here I want to focus on the ways in which the 
Kant-Sellars view of the ‘I think’ relates to the wider systematic issues pertaining to nature, 
freedom, and morality that Sellars discusses in the rest of the APA article.3  Along the way I will 
argue for modifications to the views of both Kant and Sellars such that in the end a distinctively 
Kantian naturalist outlook on these issues is supposed to emerge as plausible, at least in broad 
strokes. 
 
 The most abstract but also the most fundamental unity of the thinking self, for Kant and 
Sellars, is what might be called a thought-unity: a conceptually represented unity, but one that consists 
in the unity of a form of representation rather than the representation of the self as a unified thing 
or object or substance, whether material or immaterial. Kant’s arguments for this are familiar but 
controversial. They start out, for example, with the distinction between manifolds or successions 
of thoughts or experiences taking place in a consciousness, in contrast to the thought or experience 
 
3 For a sustained analysis and defense of central aspects of the views of both Kant and Sellars on the nature 
of the thinking self, see Jay F. Rosenberg’s unjustly neglected book, The Thinking Self (Rosenberg 2008), 
recently re-issued by Ridgeview Publishing Company (www.ridgeviewpublishing.com). For a basic 
presentation of Kant’s conception of the self as it figures in the Critique of Pure Reason, see O’Shea 2014, 
especially chapter 4.  
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of such manifolds or successions as a manifold or a succession, in a judgment or conceptual rule. 
The latter sorts of object-constituting thought-unities or conceptual rules are argued to be 
necessary for the possibility of any potentially self-aware experience – for example, for the 
possibility of any awareness or representation of oneself as having experiences of a world of objects 
or phenomena that exist independently of those experiences.  On this Kant-Sellars view, a thinking 
self is, at least with respect to this first most abstract necessary condition, itself an achievement of 
representation or thought. The key point is this: on this view, it just is in thinking in accordance 
with the rule-governed conceptual distinctions and experience-informed inferential patterns that 
implicitly distinguish a generally lawful world of objects from one’s perspectival experiences of 
them, that we thereby implicitly represent ourselves as experiencers of that world in the first place. 
On Kant’s view, to uncover this feature of our consciousness through transcendental abstraction 
or reflection is not to reify the self in any further sense than as just stated. This is why, for example, 
if one goes searching for the self phenomenologically or experientially, one finds it to be 
systematically elusive (cf. O’Shea 2015). 
 
 What Sellars rightly goes on to emphasize in this account, however, is what it does not 
entail, both what it rules out, and what it leaves open.  By contrast, what I will call the general 
disembodiment style of objections to Kant’s views on these and other matters, both in his theoretical 
and his practical philosophy, is the familiar form of criticism that in thus conceiving the self (or as 
we shall also see, freedom and morality) in such attenuated, abstract, or formal terms – and worse, 
of course, as also characterized by apparent assertions of ultimately “supersensible” or non-spatio-
temporal existence – Kant renders impossible any ultimately satisfactory account of our naturally 
embodied cognition and practical agency in the empirical world. However, I think that in cases 
where there is something right about the disembodiment style of objections to Kant’s view, at least 
as far as Kant himself is concerned, more often than not the objections locate the problems in the 
wrong place. And unlike those more familiar objections, in the APA paper Sellars sketched original 
interpretations of Kant’s theoretical and practical philosophy that, while departing from Kant in 
certain key respects, provide what I contend is an unusually penetrating interpretation of Kant’s 
own views.  
 
 The present case of the nature of the thinking self is a particularly difficult one to sort out 
in this respect.  Sellars begins by analyzing Kant’s view of the I in the Paralogisms as supporting 
three main points: 
 
(1)  the I is a being of unknown species which thinks; 
(2)  the I doesn’t simply ‘have thoughts’: it thinks – but in knowing that it thinks, and 
what it thinks, we are not knowing what sort of being it is. 
Yet, 
 (3) the I must have a nature – what it is we cannot know, though we can know that it 
is not material substance.  (I §22) 
 
Sellars explains Kant’s claims roughly as follows. What we know a priori is the I as a form of 
thought-unity, as I have put it.  We cannot, by contrast, know a priori the nature of the I as a thing 
or object, i.e., as the ‘ultimate subject’ of our thoughts in that sense.  Kant’s further claim, that we 
can, however, know that the nature of the I is not material, pertains to matter conceived as the 
movable in space, as res extensa (or more accurately, as fields of force) in space and time.   
 
 The ground of claim (3) is not, Sellars says, because on Kant’s view we have any “positive, 
let alone adequate, idea of mind as a sort of being” (I §18).  Rather, it is in part because of the 
arguments mentioned above from the Deduction. The materialists and reductive empiricists are in 
danger of missing the crucial transcendental point that the irreducible representational role of the ‘the 
simple I’ of apperception cannot be accounted for in terms of concepts pertaining to the spatial 
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pluralities with which matter presents us.  And that is correct, I think, insofar as we are talking, at 
least at this level of functional abstraction, only about the necessary unity of a certain form of 
representation or thought-unity. Furthermore, Sellars suggests, (3) finds additional support for 
Kant from his view that our empirical knowledge of the self finds no space, so to speak, in the 
primary qualities of matter for our mental states as we are aware of them in introspection or ‘inner 
sense’.4  In the background here is Kant’s general Galilean view that the secondary sensible 
qualities, of color as experienced, for example, must have their empirical home somehow in the 
experiencer in contrast to the fields of force and materials that constitute space, for Kant.  Kant 
himself is in the end, in this domain, a kind of agnostic inner/outer empirical dualist: as Sellars puts 
it, instead “of opting for a Strawsonian account of the empirical self,” that is, a neo-Aristotelian 
account of selves as embodied persons with both mental capacities and physical characteristics, 
“Kant opts for a dualistic model” (I §41; cf. §18).   
 
 Again, he does not do so because we have any positive idea of what a mind is per se; rather, 
we know only the represented unity in our thinking that is achieved by our own thoughts, as noted 
above. If we move from consideration of the sensory aspects of consciousness to our conceptual 
thinkings per se, these for Kant are primarily functional-representational activities or rules of unity 
(cf. I §§20–1), consisting for example in the representation of law-governed modal constraints in 
experience.  For the Critical as opposed to pre-Critical Kant, our thinkings do not, contrary to 
Descartes and other Rational Psychologists, present themselves to us as having or entailing a nature 
per se (as attributes of an immaterial “mental substance”; cf. I §§18–19).  
 
 We might add that grounds for Kant’s denial of materialism in claim (3) can be found in 
his reasoned opposition throughout the Transcendental Dialectic to any global ontological claims 
about the nature of the cosmos as a complete whole per se. For Kant the latter indirect support for 
his transcendental idealism entails that all denials of immaterialism and of theism (as represented in 
the ideas of soul and God respectively) are as dogmatic as their speculative assertion, though the 
ideas themselves are warranted for us merely as regulative ‘as if’ ideas that guide our practical hopes 
and our unending theoretical enquiries (cf. O’Shea 2014, Chs. 2 and 6). With reason’s regulative 
idea of the soul, according to Kant, we can and should combat any globally assertive materialistic 
naturalism by thinking of our own thinking nature as if it were a non-spatial unified being or 
substance. But for Kant no such conclusion can in fact be non-fallaciously inferred from anything 
we actually know about our thinking selves. 
 
 So our knowledge of the I, for Kant, is limited in principle to the various a priori and 
empirical resources described above. The texts of Kant’s Paralogisms do broadly support Sellars’ 
main interpretive moves in this domain, or so I would claim.  
 
 Sellars begins to bring out the primary revision that he thinks needs to be made to Kant’s 
view in this case  – and this, I think, is one element of truth in the familiar disembodiment 
objections  – by pointing out certain ontological possibilities that Kant in the Paralogisms 
recognized as at least logically thinkable. Sellars quotes from the following passage: 
 
The identity of the consciousness of Myself in different times is therefore only a formal 
condition of my thoughts and their connection, but it does not prove at all the numerical 
identity of my subject, in which – despite the logical identity of the I – a change can go on 
that does not allow it to keep its identity; and this even though all the while the identical-
 
4 Sellars suggests that this pertains particularly to our sense-perceptual mental states: cf. I §§17, 20–1, 40.  
For the most part I will not be concerned with his various comments about “reductive materialism” insofar 
as they are (as the alert reader of Sellars will know) concerned with problems pertaining to qualitative 
sensory consciousness and Sellars’ distinctive engagement with that issue. 
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sounding “I” is assigned to it, which in every other state, even in the replacement of the 
subject, still keeps in view the thought of the previous subject, and thus could also pass it 
along to the following one. (A363) 
 
And he comments on this as follows: 
 
[Kant] is suggesting that the “logical identity” of the I through Time, which is an analytic 
implication of the knowledge of oneself as thinking different thoughts at different times, 
is compatible with the idea that these thoughts are successive states of different ultimate 
subjects. Compare the materialist who argues that the thoughts which make up the history 
of an I are states of systems of material particles which are constantly losing old and gaining 
new constituents. (I §27) 
 
I will comment on Sellars’ final remark about materialism further below. For the present, the point 
is that it is at least barely thinkable that the mind – that is, the thinking self as thought-unity – might 
not turn out to be, in itself, an ultimate logical subject at all, but rather a series or plurality of ultimate 
subjects. In a different passage (A359), Kant also suggests the thinkable possibility that the 
thought-unity of the thinking self might turn out to be, ‘in itself’ (i.e., as ‘noumenon’), a unified 
substantial person as ground of both one’s mental capacities and one’s spatial-material attributes. 
Kant’s Paralogisms thus contain thought experiments according to which such an ultimate logical 
subject could at least thinkably be, in itself, either a substantial unity or an ultimate plurality of 
substances (with memories passed from one ‘substance’ to another, for example).5   
 
 But Sellars’ main point here is this: Kant held that the thinking self or the I is knowable 
primarily only as a set of capacities of various kinds, and for Kant we must remain agnostic about 
the ultimate grounding or realization of these capacities.  What Sellars himself is proposing at this 
point is easily misunderstood, however, especially given his comparison with “the materialist” 
quoted above. Sellars’ argument is that Kant’s own view of the thinking self, in the specific respects 
just noted, has shown why we can make a different move from Kant at this point; i.e., why it is 
intelligible for us to reject the agnosticism inherent in Kant’s own empirical dualism of the inner 
mental vs. the outer material, while nonetheless maintaining Kant’s conception of the thought-
unity of the thinking self. We can then intelligibly defend a view, which Sellars is clear that Kant 
himself did not hold, of our knowable empirical selves as fully materially embodied persons exercising 
various normatively characterized mental abilities and possessing various physical attributes. For 
what Kant has argued to be at least thinkable is that a logical subject which is necessarily not 
represented as an aspect of something more basic could nonetheless, in itself, turn out to be identical 
with something that has both thinking capacities and material attributes. And so we, if not Kant, 
can argue that in fact our irreducibly normative thinking capacities are fully realized in, and so (as 
Sellars puts this suggested revision of Kant) can in fact be “identical with[,] the being which, as 
having material attributes, is the body” (I §30).   
 
 I think both the interpretive and the reconstructive aspects of these contentions of Sellars’ 
are basically on target here too, although Sellars’ often unclear dialectical qualifications in the APA 
paper seem to have led some Kant interpreters to think that Sellars was basically or indirectly 
attributing our materialist functionalism to Kant, which as we have seen is not what Sellars was 
 
5 For important historical and conceptual discussions of these issues, including highly knowledgeable 
examinations and sympathetic criticisms of Sellars’ readings of Kant, within the context of a more classically 
metaphysical outlook on Kant’s views on the soul in the first Critique than I am presenting here, see Ameriks 
2000, e.g. pp. 62–3. 
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doing.6 The particular speculative suggestion is not that Kant himself was either a functionalist or a 
non-reductive materialist, but that we might adopt and put Kant’s own critical-transcendental 
account of the thinking self to use within what we might call a Kantian naturalist conception of our 
irreducibly normative yet fully materially embodied thinking nature. 
 
 From this perspective we can agree with Kant’s famous argument in the Refutation of 
Idealism, while rejecting Kant’s own inner/outer empirical dualism.  That is, we can agree that the 
cognition of the temporal ordering of one’s own mental states depends upon a prior background 
involving the direct cognition of persisting material objects in space in general.  But what Sellars 
notes now, however, is that given Kant’s view of the nature of the world of appearances in space 
and time, presumably the mental states of our reconstructed, fully embodied (Strawsonian-
Aristotelian) persons, just as much as is the case in relation to Kant’s own empirical dualism of the 
objects of inner and outer sense, “would be ‘appearances’ belonging to a deterministic natural 
order” (I §40). For as Sellars notes, all of the “states of the empirical self,” for Kant, both inner 
and outer, “belong to a deterministic system of events the core of which consists of material events 
occurring to interacting material substances” (I §44). The problem of determinism thus provides 
Sellars with a quiet segue into the second half of the APA paper, on topics concerning freedom 
and morality.   
 
 What eventually becomes clear by the end of the paper is that Sellars takes Kant’s reference 
not just to “this I or he” but in particular to “it, the thing” which thinks, to be a hint that all of the 
preceding views about the irreducible yet (we might hold) fully materially embodied thinking self 
has not yet by itself given us the human person, properly speaking (cf. I §62–3).  Rather, by 
themselves the sorts of theoretical considerations (in Kant’s sense) considered so far might 
conceivably only give us what Sellars calls “an automaton spirituale or cogitans, a thinking mechanism” 
(I §63).7  As he puts it: 
 
What is haunting Kant, in this cryptic passage [i.e., “this I, or he or it, (the thing) which 
thinks”], is the concept of an automaton spirituale, a mind which conceptualizes, but only in 
response to challenges from without, and in ways which, however varied, realize set 
dispositions. (I §65) 
 
With regard to “it, (the thing) which thinks” Sellars refers us to Kant’s statement in his later 
Metaphysics of Morals that a “thing is that to which nothing can be imputed” (MM 6:223).8  And if we 
 
6 Even Ameriks (see 2000: 81n84) would in this respect appear to attribute to Sellars more than the latter is 
actually asserting of Kant when he (Sellars) writes that “Kant’s analysis of the Paralogisms opens the way for 
him to hold . . . that the empirical I . . . is identical with (i.e., is) a composite physical object” (Sellars I §30, 
first italics added); or again when Sellars writes that Kant “has kept the way clear for the view that thoughts and 
other representations are in reality complex states of a system, and in particular, of a neurophysiological 
system” (Sellars MP 240, in KTM ¶59, italics added).  Here “Sellars surely goes too far,” according to 
Ameriks (ibid.). However, in neither case, I think, does Sellars mean to suggest that Kant meant to “open 
the way” or “keep it clear” for such materialist views to be held by anyone – we’ve seen Sellars state that 
Kant denies that such materialist positions can coherently be held.  Rather, Sellars is suggesting that Kant’s 
views in this specific, highly abstract respect can be adopted and adapted by us in defense of such a view.  
 
7 For a recent discussion of Sellars’ views on Kant on spontaneity, with further helpful references to other 
recent literature on that topic (for example, Pippin 1987), see Marco Sgarbi 2012: 6–9. For an excellent 
analysis of the overall importance to Sellars of both Kant’s and post-Kantian (and in particular Hegel’s) 
views about the nature of human reflexivity and self-determining freedom, see Terry Pinkard 2006. 
 
8 References to ‘MM’ are to Kant’s The Metaphysics of Morals (1797), using the Cambridge Edition version 
and the standard Akademie edition volume: page references. 
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follow up that reference further, we find that Kant precedes that statement about thinghood with 
this one: 
 
A person is a subject whose actions can be imputed to him.  Moral personality is therefore 
nothing other than the freedom of a rational being under moral laws (whereas 
psychological personality is merely the ability to be conscious of one’s identity in different 
conditions of one’s existence). (Kant MM 6:223) 
 
In roughly the second half of the APA paper, then, what we find Sellars wrestling with is the 
question of how practical reason and intentional action, and hence freedom and morality, are 
related to our embodied personality as thinkers, or as ‘thought unities’, discussed above.  
 
 Here in the practical domain, as we saw earlier in the theoretical domain, there will be 
further opportunities for understandably misinterpreting Sellars’ carefully qualified reading of 
Kant. We have seen above that Sellars was not attributing to Kant an implausibly prescient 
materialist-functionalist philosophy of mind, but rather an empirical dualism – one which was, 
however, grounded in revolutionary formal insights about concepts as functions and about the 
unity of thought, which Sellars argues we can put to Strawsonian and functionalist uses. Similarly 
here, Sellars is not suggesting, for example, that Kant himself did conceive the unity of thought in 
the theoretical domain in accordance with an automaton conception of theoretical thinking, one that 
is characterized by what Sellars calls a merely “relative spontaneity,” and which would then be 
sharply contrasted with the genuine spontaneity or autonomy of transcendental freedom. There is 
truth in the contrast between the two, but not when reified in that way. In my view, Sellars sees 
that one important key to Kant’s philosophy in both domains is that, for Kant, abstraction in these 
respects does not entail reification.  That is, Kant’s method involves abstracting from our 
embodied experiences and actions various formal principles of thought and freedom that are 
thereby revealed as having necessarily been operative within those embodied realities themselves, 
without this reflective distinction by itself entailing any real disembodiment or non-spatio-
temporal thinghood per se, whether known or unknown.  What Sellars saw more clearly than most 
Kant commentators, I believe, is that not only embodiment but also a primacy accorded to practice 
and purpose is implicit throughout the rarefied non-empirical atmosphere of each of Kant’s three 
highly abstract Critiques, including the Transcendental Analytic of the first Critique.  
 
 On the theme of determinism, Sellars begins by commenting as follows on Kant’s view of 
the self-affection that is involved in the mind’s own introspective searching of its own contents 
(analogous to our being affected by outer objects): 
 
§66. [Kant] grants that ‘inner perception’ may be prepared for by an activity of 
searching, a direction of attention in which the mind affects itself, just as perceptual 
response may occur in a context in which we are looking for something, seeking relevant 
observations.  But why the direction of attention?  Relevance to what? Here considerations 
of purpose enter in and the first Critique simply abstracts from the purposive aspects of the 
conceptualization involved in experiential knowledge. 
 
§67. Now it is clear that although the structure of the first Critique highlights what I 
have called the relative spontaneity of the conceptualizing mind, it clearly presupposes a 
larger context in which the mind is thinking to some purpose.  Thus reference to reason 
in its practical aspect is implicit throughout the Critique, but only in the Dialectic, after the 
constructive argument is over, does it become explicit. (I §§66–7) 
 
I think the outlook sketched in these passages is crucial for correctly interpreting Kant’s critical 
philosophy across the board, and in particular for questions concerning how to understand Kant’s 
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applications of his transcendental principles in his writings beyond the three Critiques.9  Those 
applications involve increasingly empirically contentful and correspondingly a priori indeterminate 
and merely regulative domains  – applications that often, not surprisingly, have thus seemed to 
many interpreters to involve inconsistent shifts in Kant’s doctrines across these different contexts.  
But Kant’s regulative maxims of reason and reflective judgment, for instance, are not solely heuristic 
‘as if’ principles of organization and search.  More fundamentally, Kant takes these more empirical 
and (as he puts it) “indeterminate” regulative principles and generic material applications to be 
necessary for the very possibility of the sorts of determinative categorial experience that he had 
already analyzed, with respect to its most abstract structures, in the Transcendental Analytic of the 
first Critique.  Kant says this explicitly in various places, but it is understandably difficult to keep 
what is all along supposed to be kept implicitly in mind as one moves along from Kant’s Analogies 
of Experience, through his regulative maxims of reason, to the regulative principles of 
purposiveness in the Third Critique and beyond to all their various intended applications in nature 
and in action. 
 
 
II 
 
 
 So: what does happen in the second half of Sellars’s APA paper, by way of making explicit 
the wider practical context that was left implicit in the above doctrines concerning our embodied 
conceptual thinking?   We left off at the point where Sellars had noted that the “states of the 
empirical self” for Kant, both inner and outer, “belong to a deterministic system of events” (I §44).  
Here Sellars begins by introducing a further modification of Kant’s views concerning the empirical 
self.  He suggests that Kant, like many other philosophers, implicitly assumes that if nature is 
indeed a deterministic system, it must follow from this that we ourselves are passively caused to be in 
whatever mental or physical states we are in.  “The picture,” Sellars writes, “is that all natural 
objects are passive with respect to their states – so that if they cause other things to change, they 
do so because they have, in their turn, been caused by other things to be in the state by virtue of 
which they are causes” (I §48).   
 
 By contrast, Sellars contends (and argues elsewhere) that “The past is not something with respect 
to which we are passive” (I §49), and that this is so even on the assumption that we along with 
everything else are thoroughly ensconced within nature considered as a deterministic, physical 
system.  This idea reflects Sellars’ own unique version, at least in this respect, of the familiar 
compatibilist contention that only in certain kinds of circumstances are we (as we would ordinarily 
say) forced or compelled by “foreign causes,” as Kant puts it (cf. I §50), to think or to act or to will 
as we do.  In our thinking, for example – and hence in our intentions, volitions, and actions, too 
– we are not entirely the playthings of nature but are also actively thinking, self-monitoring systems, 
as it were.  “Pure apperception,” writes Sellars, “gives us a non-passive awareness of the mind as 
active.  Indeed [he continues], Kant insists again and again that the mind is aware of the ‘unity’ 
and ‘spontaneity’ of its acts of synthesis” (I §56). 
 
 But Sellars does argue plausibly that, for Kant, the spontaneity of which we are thus aware, 
considered so far solely from the theoretical perspective, and in relation to the determined 
appearances of inner and outer sense, might, for all that, still be the merely responsive “relative 
 
9 For a detailed example of how this work out with respect to Kant’s Second Analogy in relation to the 
regulative maxims of reason (in the Appendix to the Dialectic) and reflective judgment (in Kant’s third 
Critique), see O’Shea 1997. One can also find in that article references to Kant commentators who find 
radical shifts or internal confusions in Kant’s views in this domain as a result, I argue, of failing to appreciate 
this crucial aspect of Kant’s philosophical methodology. 
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spontaneity” of a “thinking mechanism” (I §63) – a “theoretical automaton spirituale” (I §68), as Sellars 
puts it.  Drawing the familiar computer analogy, he suggests that in this sense the mind’s 
spontaneously initiated logical ‘searches’ in response to data and given its own “computational 
dispositions” (I §58) would ultimately still be a form of passivity, “though not sheer passivity” (I 
§59).  The relative spontaneity of pure apperception, so considered, would in this case remain, as 
Sellars puts it using Kant’s terms, “another example of a cause the causality of which is [itself] 
caused” (I §59). 
 
 It is only in the final quarter of the APA paper that Sellars comes to the properly practical 
domain from which the earlier analysis of our self-conscious theoretical cognition has abstracted.  
This concluding analysis takes place in two Kantian steps: not surprisingly, first in relation to what 
would basically be a neo-Humean conception of heteronymous agency, in Kant’s sense; and then 
finally in relation to autonomous agency, or “acting for the sake of principle” (I §85): “freedom in 
the deeper sense...[Kant] is seeking to explicate.”  
 
 Firstly, then, Sellars explains that the relatively spontaneous “freedom of choice” or 
Willkür of (in this case) a heteronymous agent would essentially involve the agent’s combining 
various intentions and desires with factual information in a procedure that generates “alternative 
courses of action, one or other of which, ratified by the appetitive faculty, would become the 
decided course of action” (I §68).  Within this picture is a higher-order practical premise of “self-
love,” to use the traditional term, reflecting the natural human interest in promoting one’s own 
happiness.  Practical reason, exclusively so conceived, would not have a principle that is peculiar or 
intrinsic to itself, as Sellars puts it; rather, our practical reason would serve, in the above way, the 
naturally implanted end of pursuing one’s own happiness, for example, in relation to one’s other 
“particular desires and aversions” (I §75).10 
 
 By contrast, secondly, Sellars cuts quickly to the chase scene by bluntly formulating his 
own version of the practical premise that is intrinsic to practical reason, what Kant calls ‘pure’ 
practical reason, in the following way (Sellars develops this elsewhere, in particular in SM chapter 
7; see Koons, this volume, for further discussion):  
 
[The practical premise that is intrinsic to practical reasoning is:]  “Let any of us persons do 
that in each circumstance which promotes our common good” (I §79).   
 
Sellars indicates that he will “not attempt to justify the ascription of exactly this premise to Kant,” 
though he does remark that Kant’s own fundamental moral law is generic in character rather than 
“purely formal” as interpreters of Kant, he thinks, have mistakenly supposed. It does seem to me 
that scholarship on Kant’s practical philosophy over the last several decades has indeed 
increasingly stressed that Kant’s moral law, for all its formal universality, is reflectively abstracted 
from the ways in which it functions both within the natural pursuit of human happiness and in the 
cultivation of a virtuous character, and hence in relation to our naturally embodied feelings and 
inclinations. The case in this respect closely parallels the points I stressed earlier in relation to our 
materially embodied capacity for ‘pure apperception’ as thinkers, as well as concerning the 
intended empirical realization of Kant’s transcendental principles as one moves from the first two 
Critiques to the third Critique on natural purposiveness and beyond to Kant’s later writings.  In the 
 
10 Remarkably, Valaris 2013 (section 1) refers to and argues against what he characterizes as “the so called 
‘relative spontaneity’ view, which is championed by commentators like Wilfrid Sellars . . .” In fact Sellars’ 
intention is to do precisely the opposite of that, both as an interpretation of Kant and in his own voice. (This 
is not to say, of course, that there is not for Sellars an element of truth in the ‘relative spontaneity’ view at 
its own, primarily non-Kantian level, as we shall see.) Here again Sellars seems not to have done an adequate 
job signaling his intentions in the paper to his readers. 
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Presidential Address, in my view, Sellars’ remarkable if unheralded achievement was to have 
articulated the most fundamental abstract principles of the first two Critiques in a way that, against 
the tide of Kant interpretation at the time, correctly situated Kant’s accounts of cognition and 
freedom in relation to their intended naturally embodied realizations. 
 
 This is not the occasion to attempt an explication of Sellars’ moral theory in detail, but for 
present purposes a few words on the core truth that he finds in his reformulation of Kant’s moral 
law will be helpful.  The moral point of view consists most fundamentally in our capacity to have 
practically efficacious thoughts, the content of which, as generically expressed in the above 
principle or “practical premise,” is a shared intention or practical commitment that, crudely put, 
any of us persons act in ways that promote our common good.  This of course immediately 
generates a host of questions concerning the specification of the relevant ‘we’ or community of 
‘persons’, and concerning the idea that, as Sellars claims, this practical premise “constitutes a 
purpose which can be said to be implied by the very concept of a community of persons” (§79).  
And Sellars also recognizes that the compact generic reference within the Kantian practical premise 
to what, in each circumstance, “promotes our common good,” glosses over empirical realities and 
uncertain means-end reasonings of enormous complexity.  Without ignoring the existence of those 
and many other difficulties, however, the following core conception of our practical agency 
emerges in Sellars’ closing discussions.    
 
 Whatever it is that might thus be taken to be the means to promote our common good, 
Sellars here simply dubs “condition α,” so that the generic practical premise now becomes: “Let 
any of us persons do that which satisfies condition α,” from which premise, along with relevant 
information, practical reasoning would derive the particular volitional conclusion: “Let me now 
do A” (§80).  Importantly, however, that I actually do A, Sellars points out, assumes not simply 
that I understand that implication (i.e., the implication, roughly: ‘Let any of us do α, so let me now 
do A’), but also that I actually affirm the antecedent of this implication, i.e. the generic practical 
premise itself.  We can see what Sellars has in mind here when he brings in the typically conflicting 
practical premise of self-love (or of sympathy, or of some other fundamental first-order interest).  
For then “in cool hours,” as Sellars puts it echoing Joseph Butler, we will confront within ourselves 
the following two opposed practical thoughts: 
 
(1)  “Let me now do A, because let any of us do actions satisfying α, although this implies not 
promoting my happiness by doing B.”   [This would be acting autonomously “from the 
moral point of view”, i.e. “choosing to do something for the reason that it is implied by 
the moral law,” that is, “as being what I ought to do” (I §§83–5).]   
 
As opposed to: 
 
(2)   “Let me now do B, because let me now promote my happiness, although this implies my 
not doing A, which is subsumable under the principle ‘let any of us do actions satisfying 
α.”  [This is to “choose” (Willkür) from “the ‘personal’ point of view” (I §82), whether 
from self-love, as here, or from sympathy or from any other feeling or interest.] 
 
 The moral point of view is thus a form of thinking, for Sellars’ Kant:  an internally 
motivating thought or efficacious intention (once “affirmed”) that is generic in its content, as being 
a commitment that any of us persons perform certain kinds of action in certain kinds of 
circumstances.  As Sellars puts it: “That practical reason is autonomous means that a choice is 
possible in which practical reason itself affirms the antecedent,” i.e. the generic practical premise, 
rather than one’s choice issuing solely from the relative practical spontaneity that is ultimately, 
however complex, a so-called ratification by one’s inclinations or interests (I §85).  It is our capacity 
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to act autonomously “for the sake of principle,” Sellars concludes, that distinguishes us from what 
would otherwise, without that capacity, be the exclusively heteronymous choices of an “it (the thing) which thinks.” 
 
 Note that Sellars has here quietly exploited Kant’s distinction between Willkür, or freedom 
of choice, as distinguished from an autonomous Wille as the generic or abstract motivating 
intention to act from the moral point of view (I §§81, 85). Supposing we lacked an autonomous 
Wille, or an intrinsically practical reason in Sellars’ sense, he points out that we would still exercise 
the relatively spontaneous but ultimately heteronymous power of appetite-ratified choice as 
outlined above. But crucially, Sellars’ particular account explains how it is that, even as the 
autonomous rational beings that we are, we must still always exercise choice or Willkür as to the 
matter of which antecedent premise-intention is (implicitly or explicitly) affirmed in the circumstances, i.e. that of 
morality or (for example) self-love.  For Sellars is clear that it is not intrinsic to autonomous practical 
reason, but rather a matter of choice (Willkür), that one in point of fact affirms one rather than 
the other – that is, that the one motivating thought rather than the other motivating thought in 
point of fact turns out to be efficacious in motivating one’s action.  (Though Sellars does not 
mention it here, this account is presumably also designed to help with the classic interpretive 
problem of addressing how Kant’s moral philosophy is able to account for our freedom to choose 
to act immorally, that is, to freely choose evil.)  
 
 In closing his address Sellars adds these final remarks on the wider picture that involves 
Kant’s transcendental idealism (I briefly come back to this in part III, sections [3] and [4] below): 
 
§86.  Kant ends on an agnostic note.  We are conscious, in pure apperception, of 
ourselves as autonomous rational beings, beings which can act out of respect for principle. 
But is not, perhaps, this consciousness an illusion? He claims to know, on philosophical 
grounds, that as objects of empirical knowledge we are not autonomous beings. We cannot, 
alas, show, on philosophical grounds, that as noumena we are autonomous. He therefore 
takes refuge in the claim that, equally, we cannot know, on philosophical grounds, that as 
noumena we are not autonomous. (I §86) 
 
I will close with some final reflections on this Kant-Sellars conception of thought and of agency 
as it has emerged in striking form in Sellars’ APA address.   
 
 
III 
 
 
 [1]  First, note Sellars’ remark, just quoted, that “we are conscious, in pure 
apperception, of ourselves as autonomous rational beings.”  This remark restores the implicit 
practical context of autonomy from which the theoretical examination of the merely “relative 
spontaneity” of pure apperception had abstracted for the analytical purposes then at hand.  This 
is not to say that our theoretical judgments and ‘syntheses’, according to either Sellars or Kant, are 
acts in the sense of deliberate, intentional actions.  But it does suggest that both conceptual thinking 
and practical thinking for Kant and Sellars involve the capacity to reflect on principles, and also 
that without the implicit wider practical and purposive context we would not be the self-
consciously apperceptive thinkers that we are. 
 
 [2]  Second, it seems to me that there is a complex, at least ostensible circularity implicit 
in Sellars’ account of the role of normative principles in our practical agency.  The situation, I 
think, closely parallels the ostensible circularity that Sellars wrestled with throughout his career in 
the theoretical or epistemic domain: namely, that between our general epistemic principles on the 
one hand, and the particular non-inferential judgments that such principles are supposed to 
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warrant on the other.  Elsewhere I discuss what I call Sellars’ Kantian naturalist solution to that 
epistemic circularity problem (most recently in O’Shea 2016b, section 4), and the parallel issue in 
the present case can be stated this way.  The conception of normative ‘ought’s that Sellars has 
exploited in his discussion of agency in the APA paper rests elsewhere on his more general account 
of ‘we intentions’ (e.g., cf. SM chapter 7 and Koons, this volume).11 But the latter account of 
community intentions rests on Sellars’ conception of individual intentions as practically efficacious 
motivating thoughts that have both their sense and their efficacy only within an already normative 
‘space of reasons’, i.e. within a framework of implicit ‘ought-to-be’ rules governing our linguistic and 
other behaviors. Put more curtly, then, Sellars explains normative principles or ‘ought’s ultimately 
in terms of certain kinds of intentions; but what it is to be an intention, on his view, is constituted 
by its role within an already normative space of reasons and linguistic ought-to-be’s.  The ostensible 
circle has ‘oughts explained in terms of intentions’ and yet ‘intentions explained in terms of a space 
of oughts’. 
 
 I think Sellars’ way of seeing this ostensible circle as benign or merely apparent will have 
something like the same structure as the Kantian naturalist account of the warrant for epistemic 
principles that he gives, for example, in “More on Givenness and Explanatory Coherence” 
(MGEC).  Along one dimension, that is, normative principles are ‘always already there’ in our 
cultural inheritance in its continuing conceptual and practical development over time. From this 
perspective it is norms both ‘all the way down’ and ‘all the way back’, so to speak.  Within this 
outlook a kind of diachronic reflective equilibrium is continually sought between our particular 
sets of judgments, inferences, and actions, and the more generic but revisable normative principles 
that are espoused and reflected in those practices.  This dimension also includes for Sellars, both 
in the APA article and in MGEC, various stronger Kantian-style claims: for example in the 
practical domain, as we have seen, claims about personhood as entailing a certain autonomous 
capacity to institute norms and to act on principle as such; and claims about moral commitments 
as in some way conceptually connected to the idea of a community as such.   
 
 But in the epistemic domain, at any rate, Sellars indicates that there must also be another, 
circle-breaking naturalistic dimension of explanation as well, and in particular a biological 
evolutionary explanation of the ultimate origin of our capacity for conceptual-linguistic thinking 
itself.  As Sellars wrote in MGEC:   
 
Presumably the question 'How did we get into the [epistemic] framework' has a causal 
answer, a special application of evolutionary theory to the emergence of beings capable of 
conceptually representing the world of which they have come to be a part. (MGEC §79) 
 
Nature in itself, for Sellars, in one primary sense, knows no ‘ought’s.  But natural selection over 
time, according to Sellars, generates patterns of bodily-environmental, instinctual-behavioral, and 
proto-cognitive adaptation such that what it is to be any such item so functioning cannot be 
understood apart from its place within such a wider normative network or ‘selection space’ of 
biological ought-to-be’s. The Kant-Sellars account in the APA paper of both our apperceptive 
intelligence and our autonomous agency must be understood as all along embedded within a wider 
framework of our naturally adaptive or purposive animal inheritance.  In a structurally similar but 
of course altogether differently grounded way, the highly abstract ‘analytic’ sections of Kant’s first 
and second Critiques arguably cannot be understood except in terms of their always intended 
embodied embedding within the regulatively systematic conception of natural purposiveness that 
Kant outlines in the Appendix to the Dialectic in the first Critique and then subsequently expands 
upon in the third Critique.  
 
11 For a detailed historical analysis of Sellars’ evolving views on the nature of normativity in the earlier stages 
of his career, see Olen (2016). 
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 [3]  Third, we must in the end come to terms with the elephant in the room: Kant’s 
transcendental idealism, and Sellars’ proposal to replace Kant’s noumena with the postulation of 
unobservables that is characteristic of ongoing scientific theorizing. I have been focusing on 
Sellars’ naturalism conceived as integrated fully within the above Kant-Sellars story in the APA 
address about our embodied practical agency in the knowable material world, as supplemented 
with some amplification of Sellars’ conception of our evolved animal purposiveness. I have not 
discussed Sellars’ own quasi-Kantian transcendental idealism, with its scientifically reconceived 
noumena put forward as a replacement for Kant’s unknowable ‘things in themselves’, and with 
the object-ontology of the manifest image, with respect to that ‘noumenal’ object-ontology, 
supposed to be revealed to be a framework of mere ‘appearances’ that is strictly speaking false (for 
the details, see O’Shea 2016b, and my comments on Brandom in this volume).12  Sellars was well 
aware that Kant himself did not defend the particular ‘analogical’ and ‘relocational’ story about our 
sensory consciousness of colored objects, and so on, that forms the centerpiece of Sellars’ own 
confessedly non-Kantian argument for transcendental idealism in ch. 2 of Science and Metaphysics. 
Kant’s own transcendental idealism was concerned primarily with recommending the wholesale 
critical replacement of the traditional object-oriented ends of speculative theoretical metaphysics with 
the idealized ends of our own practical rationality and moral freedom.  
 
 On Kant’s view we must in the end think of nature analogically in terms of an all-powerful 
intelligent designer’s purposive practical handiwork, thus experiencing nature ‘as if’ it were 
designed for us to know it through our contingent empirical researches, and ‘as if’ it were built for 
the gradual achievement of our highest good using the crooked timber of our practical agency.  
Kant himself thus formulated our inevitable analogical thoughts about unconditioned ‘things in 
themselves’ in terms of the theoretical and practical regulative ideas of God and of our own souls, 
conceived by analogy with our own practical arts and agencies.  The deepest irony of all – and 
Kant himself is in no small part to blame for this – is that whereas Kant’s single most important 
aim in the critical philosophy was to urge this entirely practical replacement for the traditional object-
oriented rationalist metaphysics (including his own pre-Critical Leibnizian metaphysics), thus calling 
for a revolutionary turn to the morally practical and to the scientifically natural, it has unfortunately 
been what Kant’s readers have taken to be his own indulgence in a thoroughly dubious speculative 
metaphysics of unknowable objects as ‘things in themselves’ that has continued to mar his 
philosophical legacy.  
 
 I have argued elsewhere that we ought to reject Sellars’ quasi-transcendental idealist (and 
in my view, non-Kantian) contention that the object-ontology of “the common sense 
framework”—that is, the “manifest image” conception of perceptible, colored physical objects—
“is transcendentally ideal, i.e. that there really are no such things as the objects of which it speaks” 
(SM V, §95; italics added; again, see O’Shea 2016b). What can and should be preserved from 
Sellars’ account of sensory consciousness is not his specific quasi-transcendental-idealist 
relocational ontology (which was based on Sellars’ own unquestioned but disputable qualia 
intuitions concerning ‘ultimate homogeneity’; cf. Rosenthal 2016), but rather the more general 
strategy behind Sellars’ then-revolutionary scientific naturalist philosophy of mind.  This was the 
general open-ended idea that the scientific hypothesis of various representational systems in 
human cognition could be systematically integrated, in a non-trivial way, within the sort of 
irreducibly normative ‘space of reasons’ for which Sellars is now rightly famous. In different ways 
Paul Coates, David Rosenthal, Huw Price, Daniel Dennett, Ruth Millikan, Jay Rosenberg, Paul 
Churchland, and other Sellars-influenced philosophers have substantively explored ways of 
 
12 For a good recent examination of Kant’s theoretical philosophy from a broadly Sellarsian perspective, 
and one which, however, similarly seeks to integrate scientific realism within Kant’s phenomenal world 
rather than in competition with it, see Landy 2015. 
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integrating such naturalistic theories of perceptual representation and evolved animal agency 
within, rather than in philosophical isolation from, various of Sellars’ other distinctive views in 
epistemology, semantics, and metaphysics.  Furthermore, it is also surely in the spirit of both Kant 
and Sellars, not to mention Peirce, to suggest that just which kinds of revision of our empirically 
manifest object-ontology might ultimately be required in the future, however radical, should primarily 
be a matter of ongoing case-by-case inquiry rather than quasi-transcendental argument.  
Sometimes such explanatory revisions might fit Sellars’ Kuhnian-style ontological replacement 
model, but in other cases, particularly in biology and other special sciences, functional realization 
and other non-reductive models of explanatory integration are likely to remain more apt (as 
perhaps Wilfrid’s father, Roy Wood Sellars, would have stressed).    
 
 [4] Finally, suppose now that, as just recommended, we thus reject Sellars’ quasi-
transcendental ‘scientific noumenalism’ (as it were), according to which the ordinary coloured 
physical objects of the manifest image strictly speaking do not exist, while accepting in all other 
respects his otherwise Kantian and integrated scientific naturalism (again, I chart this course in 
O’Shea 2016b).  The remaining question is whether the account of Kant’s transcendental freedom 
that Sellars has offered introduces any conceptions of our thought and agency that must be 
inconsistent with the sort of integrated Sellarsian and Kantian naturalism that I have been 
attempting to delineate in this chapter. Has Kant’s conception of autonomy really added anything 
that is somehow mysteriously beyond the evolved conceptual capacities for perception, inference, 
and volition that we are now assuming to be in place within a non-reductive yet fully embodied 
Kantian naturalism?   
 
 Just as we followed Sellars in trading Kant’s empirical dualism for fully embodied 
Strawsonian personhood, however, I think that Sellars’ conceptual distinction mentioned earlier 
between causally relevant circumstances as opposed to globally metaphysically determinist pseudo-
circumstances, together with the resulting idea that we are not passive with respect to the past, 
would be worth exploring as taking the sting out of Kant’s claim, as we saw Sellars put it earlier, 
that we supposedly “know, on philosophical grounds, that as objects of empirical knowledge we 
are not autonomous beings” (§86). As naturalists with that conception of Willkür or freedom of 
choice we could then plausibly agree with both of the following seemingly contradictory (but in 
fact merely ‘Dialectically’ opposed) claims by Kant in the following passage from the second 
Critique:  
 
One can therefore grant that if it were possible for us to have such deep insight into a 
human being’s cast of mind, . . . that we would know every incentive to action, even the 
smallest, as well as all the external occasions affecting them, we could calculate a human 
being’s conduct for the future with as much certainty as a lunar or solar eclipse and could 
nevertheless maintain that the human being’s conduct is free. (Kant, Critique of Practical 
Reason, Ak. 5:99)  
 
But as we have seen, Sellars in the APA address has also taken his modified agreement with Kant 
on freedom a step further, as follows.  
 
 As noted above, intentions and volitions for Sellars are practically efficacious thoughts that 
ceteris paribus give rise to the corresponding actions so conceived; and in that sense such intentions 
are intrinsically or internally motivating.13 A genuinely autonomous Wille or pure practical reason 
in particular, on Sellars’ reading, concerns our capacity to be motivated to action by a thought the 
 
13 Compare, in the opposite direction of fit, Sellars’ view of perceptions as conceptualized thoughts that 
suitable subjects are normally caused to have in response to the corresponding kinds of object in 
appropriate situations.   
 15 
generic or abstract content of which, from the moral point of view, is not specifically about any of 
our ends or interests in particular. Such a practically efficacious thought or ‘pure idea of reason’ is 
characterized by Kant as ‘a-temporal’ or ‘supersensible’ in part because its content is disinterested or 
non-empirical in the non-mysterious way just noted; and also because in deliberating and acting 
from such a motive or conceptualized point of view I must ‘practically presuppose’, as Kant 
variously puts it, that my own generic thought or idea of reason is the sufficient cause of my action.  
 
 Kant thinks that experience shows that we do have the capacity to act both in conformity to 
and in opposition to such a principle or abstractly motivating thought; and he contends that this 
is sufficient to assert our freedom without our being able to prove its metaphysical reality 
theoretically.  What the critique of speculative object-metaphysics shows, according to Kant, is 
that the capacity for such an autonomously motivating thought or idea is not ruled out by anything 
we could ever come to know about nature from a scientific or theoretical perspective – and this is 
the real root of what Sellars above called Kant’s “agnostic note”: that at least “we cannot know, on 
philosophical grounds, that as noumena we are not autonomous” (I §86, quoted above).  
 
 There are of course influential ways of reading Kant’s transcendental idealism that fit 
congenially with our having rejected Sellars’ strongly ‘scientific noumenalism’ understood as the 
thesis that the objects of the manifest image strictly speaking do not exist. On such readings Kant’s 
so-called agnosticism concerning noumena becomes functionally equivalent to restraining oneself 
from certain inevitably tempting but fallacy-ridden ‘dogmatic’ ideas, together with the realization 
that those particular ideas were really all along intended for practically and theoretically regulative 
uses rather than for metaphysical object-cognition.  Or if one just cannot manage to see Kant 
himself entirely in this sweetly revolutionary practical light, then the alternative would be to leave 
transcendental idealism behind entirely and follow the pragmatists in pushing the regulative 
fallibilism of Kant’s Dialectic more strongly than Kant envisioned.14  Either way, however, a 
Kantian empirical realism can and should be defended as real realism: as a naturally embodied 
realism within a comprehensive normative-practical turn.  And that Kantian naturalist vision was 
the central message that Sellars intended his audience to take away from his remarkable 1970 
Presidential Address to the APA.15 
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